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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG FOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
GEORGE WEIHING and ARLENE 
WEIHING, dba GREEN RIVER TACO 
TIME, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 860213 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF 
SECTION 18 OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT. 
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PAROL 
EVIDENCE AND IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUING SECTION 18. 
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
INTRODUCTION OF PAROL EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
ON THE MEANING AND INTENT OF SECTION 18 OF THE 
FRANCHISE AGREEMENT. 
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE 
APPELLANT WOULD BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED IF NOT REQUIRED 
TO JOIN THE TEN STATE AREA ADVERTISING TRUST EVEN 
THOUGH THE RESPONDENT DID NOT PLEAD OR PROVE A CLAIM 
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
V. WHETHER ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED THE 
APPELLANT IF HE SUCCEEDS ON APPEAL AS THE "PREVAILING 
PARTY." 
VI. WHETHER THE APPELLANT OR RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor 
of the Respondent for an alleged breach of franchise 
agreement involving whether or not the Appellant is 
obligated to join an advertising co-op known as the Ten 
State Area Advertising Trust and pay 2% of his gross 
profits to such entity. 
The Respondent's complaint alleged the Appellant had 
breached a franchise agreement by refusing to pay a 
percentage of gross profits and by failing to provide 
detailed financial statements each month. (R.l). The 
Respondent sought monetary relief and attorney's fees. 
At trial the Respondent conceded that the detailed 
financial statements were insignificant and the central 
issue was whether the Appellant was required to join the 
advertising co-op and to pay a percentage of gross income. 
The trial court permitted the introduction of parol 
evidence over Appellant's objection and ruled in favor of 
the Respondent by entering a declaratory judgment 
obligating the Appellant to join the Ten State Area 
Advertising Trust and ordering the payment of 2% of 
Appellant's gross sales per month, by granting a judgment 
in favor of the Respondent representing 2% of gross sales 
for the period of April 8, 1983 through December 31, 1985, 
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by determining the Appellant had breached the franchise 
agreement for failing to provide monthly financial 
statements and awarding $1.00 nominal damage, and by 
awarding the Respondent $2,800.00 in attorney's fees as 
the prevailing party. 
There is no challenge on appeal to the trial court's 
finding that the Appellant had failed to provide monthly 
financial statements or the $1.00 nominal award. There is 
no issue that the Appellant is current on all royalty 
payments due. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is the operator of a "Home Town Taco Time" 
fast food restaurant located in Green River, Emery County, 
Utah. Green River is a town of approximately 1,200 
inhabitants and is located in southeastern Utah 
approximately 186 miles from Salt Lake City and 106 miles 
from Grand Junction, Colorado. (T. 615). The Appellant 
and the Respondent entered into the Home Town Taco Time 
Franchise Agreement on May 4, 1977. (Ex. 5-P). The 
Appellant paid $16,000.00 as an initial deposit and agreed 
to pay 3i% royalty fees per month. (T.634 and Ex. 29 D). 
Prior to signing the Franchise Agreement, the Respondent 
led Appellant to believe that the deposit and royalty was 
going to be used, in part, for uniform advertising (T. 
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636). No one told the Appellant that he would be required 
to join any advertising co-op or pay any further fees. 
(T.637). 
The Franchise Agreement contains the following 
significant language: 
* * * * 
RECITALS 
"A. Taco Time International, Inc., an Oregon 
Corporation, (The Company) has over a period of time 
and at considerable expense developed an established 
and uniform and unique method of operation, customer 
service, advertising, publicity, processes, 
techniques and technical knowledge in connection with 
the restaurant business, the outlets for which are 
known as and named 'Taco Time'." 
* * * * 
"1. Franchise. CFI hereby grants, sells, and 
conveys to the Operator the exclusive right to 
utilize the above-mentioned methods and system, 
together with the use of available Company 
trademarks, tradenames, techniques, advertising, 
processes, receipts and designs ... ." 
* * * * 
"18. Advertising. At all times the Operator 
will conduct the business which is the subject of 
this franchise under the name 'TACO TIME1 and will 
advertise his 'TACO TIME' restaurant and its services 
on a scale consistent with the volume of his business 
and in keeping with practical business practices. In 
so advertising, the Operator will utilize all 
advertising formats, formulas, and programs furnished 
to the Operator by CFI. It is understood that CFI 
may desire to cause Operators in a given area to join 
into a uniform program of promoting given products or 
services either through sales, discounts, specials or 
other promotional devices. The Operator will 
participate in any such procedures upon the request 
of CFI." 
* * * * 
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"32. Litigation Expense. In the event that an 
action at law or suit in equity is brought to 
establish, obtain or enforce any right by either of 
the parties to this agreement, the prevailing party 
in such suit or action, both in the trial and 
appellate courts, shall be entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be recovered from the other party 
as well as that party's costs and disbursements 
incurred in such suit or action." 
* * * * 
"35. Entire Agreement. This agreement 
constitutes the entire agreement of the parties (into 
which all prior negotiations, commitments, 
representations, and undertakings with respect to the 
subject matter hereof are merged) and there are no 
oral or other written understandings or agreements 
between the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof." (All emphases added). 
* * * * 
The Respondent did not produce any witnesses concerning 
the negotiations which led to the Franchise Agreement. 
However, it admitted through its President Ed Craig that 
the Franchise Agreement was a form agreement prepared by 
Taco Time International and furnished to the Respondent 
(T. 406), admitted the Respondent had never interpreted 
Section 18 regarding advertising (T. 451), admitted 
Section 18 was silent concerning the obligation to join a 
separate entity or to pay 2% for advertising (T. 452-453), 
and admitted the Respondent has never requested that the 
Appellant himself advertise (T. 454-10). 
No issues arose under the Franchise Agreement from 
1977 until February 9, 1979. At that time the Respondent 
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wrote and asked the Appellant to join in a new Taco Time 
Advertising Trust. A separate agreement was enclosed 
which called for the Appellant to pay 1/2 of 1% of gross 
into the Trust. (Ex. 7-P). The Appellant refused. (T. 
421). The Respondent wrote again on June 26f 1979, (Ex. 
9-P) and requested again, and again the Appellant refused 
to participate. 
In June 1981, a new and separate non-profit Utah 
advertising trust known as the Ten State Area Advertising 
Association, Inc. (herein "Trust") was created for the 
purpose of advertising on behalf of its Taco Time members. 
(T. 425, Ex. 39 D). Eligibility for membership is limited 
to those who enter into a separate written subscription 
agreement between the Trust, the Respondent, and an 
operator which calls for the operator to pay 2% of gross 
sales into the trust. (Exh. 37 D). This subscription 
agreement also states in Paragraph 7 that, in order for 
the agreement to be effective, at least 75% of the 
franchised operators must agree to be solicited and join 
the Trust. 
The Respondent admits there is no connection between 
it and the Trust, that the Trust is a separate entity, 
that the Respondent does not control the Trust, and that 
the Trust was not even contemplated in 1977. (T. 436-437, 
testimony of Ed Craig, President). The Respondent 
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admitted, almost astonishingly that although it had not 
been damaged by the Appellants refusal to join the 
advertising co-op, it was seeking damages on which the 
Respondent believed was due the Trust. (T. 449). Although 
the Respondent claims in this action the advertising 
program was compulsory and not voluntary (T. 427), it 
admitted that the advertising program was described as a 
"voluntary contractual agreement" to all its operators in 
correspondence to its operators dated November 23, 1981 
(Exh. 14-P). The Respondents President, Ed Craig, 
further admitted on cross that participation in the Trust 
was voluntary. (T. 456, 458). 
No additional action on this issue occurred until 
March 23, 1983. At this time the Respondent sent 
Appellant a letter demanding the Appellant join the Trust. 
(Exh. 19-P). The Appellant did not respond and the 
present action was filed on February 4, 1984 (R. 1). The 
Respondent alleged in its complaint that the Appellant had 
failed to participate in the advertising program of the 
Trust and had failed to pay a percentage due the trust. 
The Complaint sought damages and attorney's fees. The 
Respondent did not set forth any causes of action for 
unjust enrichment or for declaratory relief. 
At trial the Defendant offered and the Court received 
evidence dehors the Franchise Agreement over the 
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Appellant's objections concerning parol evidence and 
relevancy and materiality. For example, the Court 
received Exhibits 1-P (T. 395), 2-P (T. 395) 27-P (T. 
402), and 3-P (T. 404) over such objections; and, it 
received expert testimony relative to what the industry 
standards are now over such objections and over 
further foundational objections. (T. 416, 417, 473, 501, 
668, 791 and others). The Appellant further objected, 
without success, to testimony relative to unjust 
enrichment (T. 713), to testimony relative to what other 
operators do and pay (T. 668), and to testimony relative to 
the Respondent's alleged damages due to its failure to 
respond to discovery requests (T. 537). 
At trial, Dan Jones, Secretary Treasurer, Director, 
and House Counsel of Respondent testified that the 
Franchise Agreement did not require the Appellant to pay 
2% of gross receipts for advertising. (T. 556). He 
testified that the Appellant had an obligation to 
advertise on a scale consistent with volume and practical 
business practices but not to pay any sums to the Trust. 
(T. 557). He testified the Appellant had not refused to 
join the Trust only to pay 2% of gross receipts (T. 
559). 
The Appellant produced expert evidence through Gerald 
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Shupe, P.A., that the Appellant advertised on a scale 
consistent with the volume of his business and in keeping 
with sound business practices. (T. 581). Mr. Shupe was 
the Appellant's accountant for over 20 years and was 
familiar with small businesses in Southeastern Utah. (T. 
578). Mr. Shupe testified that the Appellant's level of 
advertising was consistent with other proprietor's 
generally in Southeastern Utah (T. 580). 
Naomi Dumas, proprietor of the "Chow Hound" and chief 
competitor of the Appellant testified that she was aware 
of the Appellant's advertising expenditures and they were 
not inconsistent with hers. (T. 621-623). She believed 
she advertised according to sound business practices for 
such businesses in Southeastern Utah and so did the 
Appellant. (T. 623). 
The Appellant and his wife, Arlene Weihing, both 
testified that the methods and means of advertising in 
Southeastern Utah were sparse. Radio and T.V. and other 
electronic media advertising were impractical. (T. 642 to 
644 and T. 701 to 705). The Appellant advertised in local 
newspapers (T. 701), high school yearbooks, etc. (T. 701). 
Also, discounts, door prizes, free products, etc., were 
utilized. (T. 704). The Respondent's own expert agreed 
that electronic media advertising would be impractical for 
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Respondent for unpaid 2% monthly amounts apparently found 
due the Trust, and awarding attorney's fees to the 
Respondent as the "prevailing party*" 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF 
SECTION 18 OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT. 
The Appellant contends that Section 18 is clear and 
unambiguous. Section 18 does not require the Appellant to 
join any advertising co-op or to pay 2% of the Appellant's 
gross receipts to such entity: 
"18. Advertising. At all times the Operator 
will conduct the business which is the subject of 
this franchise under the name 'TACO TIME' and will 
advertise his 'TACO TIME1 restaurant and its services 
on a scale consistent with the volume of his business 
and in keeping with practical business preictices. In 
so advertising, the Operator will utilize all 
advertising formats, formulas, and programs furnished 
to the Operator by CFI. It is understood that CFI 
may desire to cause Operators in a given area to join 
into a uniform program of promoting given products or 
services either through sales, discounts, specials or 
other promotional devices. The Operator will 
participate in any such procedures upon the request 
of CFI." (Emphasis added). 
Several observations may be made concerning the language. 
First, the Appellant's obligation to advertise arises 
solely out of the first and second sentences. The 
obligation is one imposed upon the Appellant and requires 
him to advertise on a scale consistent with his business 
and in keeping with practical business practices. The 
Trial Court did not find the Appellant breached this 
-11-
o b l i g a t i o n Indeed i t c o u l d n o t , "The t e s t i m o n y was 
c o n c l u s i v e t h a t 1111« Ap[ M • i i. 1111 11 i »i.i, u L I i o 111 ui i i»iis J s i f 111 
* i Hi p r a c t i c d l b u s i n e s s p i c i c t i c e s uoder t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
w i th t l w e x c e p t i o n fh.i4 j o i n i n q an a d v e r t i s i n g c o - o p 
migh< i>* 41 pj.! i r „ii i , ., i , I'-JU i n i.\l
 r may be b e n e i i c i a l . 
SecomJ
 f Hit' A p p e l l a n t ' s o b l i g a t i o n i s t o u t i l i z e a l l 
a d v e r t i s i n g f o r m a t s , f o r m u l a s , ana prnqram1 "fniiiii iiii, In m in 
t i npeii i l i ID i i "IIif* e v i d e n c e was coi e l u s i v e tna~ 
t h e A p p e l l a n t u t i l i z e d a l l a d v e r t i s i n q f u n i^h- • *- i - y 
C F I T'he t r i a l c o u r t d H > >« ' n , ' ," 
t j L i g a t i n - n 
Third, Hoarding the ftpp^Ha* ^n^atiuu .uin 
programs as desn .1..'.'! i! ^nnes c. section 
18, the language is specific i:> - restrictive. The initial 
restriction concerns its application: it ppl « ' 
"iiNHr^im (ij mi i i ipven a reel" cannot be 
construed, as the trial court must have concluded, to be 
the entire ten states in whicr trio KP< pomif I opt i »a t tj 
'T^n !*iex+ ' i'i-,l i ,,•( i"'\ concerns the operators duty; thi 
operator must "promottel qiven products or services.1" 
This must certainly mean thr Appn])ani liii n i inuiioie 
"fcii-ncjil I ' i i i, IJUL i.j or servio s as opposed (o paying a 
percentage of gross sales. The last restriction in these 
two sentences ref<=o i ' i m» i h « 1 \ > u ' "J J1 " he 
operator must promote; he must do so through "sales, 
discounts, specials, or other promotional rinnrp 1 
-1 2 
language cannot possibly be construed to mean an operator 
must join a trust and pay a percentage of his sales. 
The plain unambiguous language sets forth the 
Appellant's contractual obligations. These contractual 
obligations were not breached by the Appellant. It is 
impossible to read into the language contained in Section 
18 any obligation of the Appellant to join a separate 
entity and pay 2% of his gross proceeds. 
The evidence also supports the view that there is no 
obligation under Section 18 for the Appellant to join the 
Trust. The unrebutted testimony of the Appellant was that 
he was told by the Respondent the Appellants $16,000 
deposit and his 3i% royalty would be usedf in part, for 
advertising. Section 1 of the Franchise Agreement 
supports this proposition. Also, the Respondent invited 
the Appellant to participate in different advertising co-op in 
1979. (Ex. 7-P). The invitation contained a separate 
agreement which did in fact have provisions for joining as 
a member and paying a percentage of gross profits. In 
addition, within six months after the formation of the Ten 
States Area Advertising Association, Inc. Trust, Mr. Ed 
Craig, President, wrote and told all operators that the 
advertising program was a "voluntary contractual 
agreement." (Ex. 14-P, T 456, 458). Moreover, the 
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The Appellant i t »»peet fuiJ > submit s the Trial Court , 
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Agreement • 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PAhOh EVIDENCE 
AND IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE r ^ * • 
PURPOSE OF CONSTRUING SECTION 1 8. • 
The Trial Court permitted the fo" ' ov; ir.--« evidence -
be r^imittod nvf r tbp Appellant fs objections: 
Evidence Description :. ; on 
1 - P Franchise Deposi t Receipt \ 9 !:i 
2-P Pro-Forma Assu mpti ons i "I"t 
' Worksheet ioi Pro-Forma 4II-1 
3-P Pro-Forma foi Appellant 403 
4 - P Appe 1 1 a 111 L III1" II mi 11 J in</* in a 1 S 1 a t « ' i i i e iJ 1 
Testimony Ed Craigr on subject of competitor's 
advertising standards 416 
Testimony Gordon Jacoxr as expert on subject 
of industry standards 473 
Testimony Gordon Jacox, as expert, on his 
interpretation of Franchise 
Agreement 493 
Testimony Marcia Walke, as Director of Trust, 
on subject of industry standards 501 
Testimony Dan Jones, as attorney for Respon-
dent on subject of industry 
standards 541 
Other citations could be provided; however, the above is 
demonstrative of the Appellant's consistent objection to 
parol evidence, irrelevant and immaterial evidence, and 
opinion evidence adduced without proper foundation. 
The Trial Court did in fact rely on such evidence in 
rendering its decision. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 of its 
Memorandum Decision (R. 356) and in Paragraphs 12 and 13 
of its Findings (R. 371), the Court construed the 
Franchise Agreement "in light of the general business 
climate and industry here involved." (Id.). 
In this case, the Franchise Agreement was an 
"integrated" contract. Article 35 provides: 
"35. Entire Agreement. This agreement 
constitutes the entire agreement of the parties (into 
which all prior negotiations, commitments, 
representations, and undertakings with respect to the 
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subject matter hereof are merged) and there are no 
oral or other written understandings or agreements 
between the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof." 
Objections based upon the parol evidence rule
 r r u l e s 
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expert testimony such as Mr. Jacox's is not germane. 
North Point Consolf Irrigation Co. v. Utah & S.L. Canal 
Co., 16 U 246, 52 P. 168; Idaho Forwarding Co. v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 8 U. 41, 29 P. 826; 31 Am.Jur.2d. 
Experts S 69. 
Further, what other competitors do in respect to 
advertising or what other standards exist in the industry 
is irrelevant and immaterial. Only the clear and 
unambiguous terms of the contract are material and 
relevant. The Appellant signed a contract in 1977 and no 
one told him that he would be bound to any industry 
standards or "general business climate." No one told him 
he was contractually bound to perform whatever obligations 
are found generally to exist in the fast food industry. 
There was no testimony concerning what the standards 
were in 1977. There is no evidence concerning what the 
general business climate was in 1977. Foundational 
objections were properly lodged. Even assuming there 
was testimony or evidence relating to 1977, there is no 
connection showing the Appellant was aware of them or 
agreed to be bound by them. 
Under the facts of this case, there is no allegation 
or finding that the contract is ambiguous. There is no 
allegation or finding of fraud. There is no request for a 
declaratory judgment concerning what the contract means. 
The language is clear and susceptible to no other meaning 
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t h a n f h e p I ii I II I i n I i 111 n 11 i1 mi H I I in | I I in wi 11 i I i i in t "I li 
Appellant"" b objections to the extraneous evidence , dehors 
the contract, should have been sustained. 
POINT 111 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE 
APPELLANT WOULD BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED IF NOT REQUIRED 
TO JOIN THE ADVERTISING TRUST AND PAY THE PERCENTAGE 
FEE WHERE THE RESPONDENT DID NOT PLEAD OR PROVE A 
CLAIM. OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
The Respondent did not pi ead a cl aim, for unjust 
enrichment. (R. 1 1 3 ) * Respondent di d not prov e sin h a 
claim or request his comp] a i nt be amended t :: • include such 
a c 1 a :i m U n j u s t e n r i c hue n t w a s n o t me n t i o n e d i n t h e 
The only time any reference was made t o unjust enrichment, 
the Respondent prompt ly objected (T 11 3) 
Ne ' i e i: t: I: :i e ] e s s ., 1:1: :it e T" i: i a II C on r t: c o n s I d € • i e d a i :i d f ou n d 
that the Appel lant's failure to join the Ten State Area 
Advertising Association, Inc. a :ivertising t:i i ist • wouII I 
h ave the e f £ ec t: o f u n j u s t e n r i chme n t: " "I 5 a c tua 1 ] y ., t h e 
Trust has not historically advertised oi I behal £ of the 
Appe 1 Iant I I1" "'» " I \ "' (I \) Ku r t hei ^  * 
advertisement beneficial 1 o the Appellant * southeastern 
Utah pivots around only name recognition an- ^de-mark 
recogn :I t i ::: n iifll: it ii zl I n r is II: <::::: 'er t a il nil j II: < 
Paragraph 11 of the Franchise Agreeing;. * Wh- *r . >* could 
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be found to be included within such provisions,* 
Decrees regarding equity must have a basis in the 
pleadings and the evidence. 61 A Am.Jur.2d Pleadings 382. 
Notice pleadingr of course, is nominally required — but 
some sort of pleading and proof is mandatory. 
Such was not present here. A party's proof cannot 
materially vary from his allegations and the judgment must 
respond to the issues raised by the pleadings. Ibid. Utah 
has always recognized these generally referenced rules. 
In Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha v. Bragg, et al, 
245 P.966 (Utah 1926) , the Court held that a petition or 
pleading of "some kind" was the jurisdictional means of 
investing a court with power of subject matter to 
adjudicate the matter. And, a judgment which is beyond or 
not supported by the pleadings must fail: 
"It is fundamental that a petition or pleading 
of some kind is the juridical means of investing a 
court with jurisdiction of subject matter to 
adjudicate itf and a judgment which is beyond or not 
supported by pleadings must fall." I<3. at 973. 
Also see In re Evansf et al, 130 P. 217 (Utah 1913), and 
Cooke v. Cooke, 248 P. 83 (Utah 1926). ("These are 
immutable elements"). 
The Appellant contends that fundamental fairness 
requires his opposing party or the Court to verbalize the 
issues in advance of trial. The Appellant concedes that 
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notice pleading may be sufficient; however, some pleading 
is essential. In this case, neither the Appellant nor the 
Respondent understood that unjust enrichment was involved 
in this litigation. 
The Respondent did not prove a claim of unjust 
enrichment requiring restitution at trial either. As 
cited by this court previously, "Unjust enrichment does 
not apply to every circumstance where one has been 
benefited by anotherfs detriment." General Leasing Co. v. 
Manivest Corp., 667 P.2d 596 (Utah 1983). (Also see, 
cases cited therein). This case does not involve 
obtaining money or property under false pretenses. It 
does not involve a factual situation where property is 
provided upon request. Acquiescence in a direct benefit 
has not occurred where a trier of fact can appropriately 
find an implied contract to pay its reasonable value. 
Here, the Appellant openly refused to join the Trust. The 
Trust did not advertise directly for the Appellant. This 
is not a case where benefits were conferred upon the 
Appellant under mistake and which equity requires a 
recompense. The benefits, if any, were officiously 
provided. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the trial 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT 
DAMAGES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROOF OF DIRECT AND 
PROXIMATE DAMAGES. 
The Respondent admitted that the Ten State Area 
Advertising Association, Inc. was a separate entity over 
which it had no control. (T. 436). It admitted that this 
advertising cooperative was not even contemplated in 1977 
when the Franchise Agreement was signed. (T. 436). Upon 
cross-examination, the President of the Respondent, Ed 
Craig, admitted that it had not been damaged due to the 
Appellant's failure to join the advertising co-op and that 
the damages sought under the Respondent's Complaint (R. 
1), were sums allegedly due the Ten State Area Advertising 
Association, Inc. (T. 449). 
The Appellant contends that the Respondent failed to 
prove $1.00 in damages. There is no testimony or any 
exhibits which show the Respondent suffered any loss. The 
lower Court found that the Appellant had to contribute 
2% of its gross profits to the Trust but then awarded over 
$4,000.00 to the Respondent. The Trust was not a party to 
these proceedings; and, even if it were, the Trust could 
not have shown the Appellant breached any agreements with 
it. There are none. Indeed, the trial court did not even 
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order the Respondent to pay over the alleged damages to 
the Trust, 
The Appellant believes the Lower Court ignored the 
rules set forth in Turtle Management Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 645 P.2d. 667 (Utah 1982). In Turtle, the 
Court established a tripartite test in establishing 
damages. First, has a legal right of the complainant been 
invaded? Second, is there a causal connection between the 
legal wrong suffered and the damages claimed? Third, is 
there sufficient certainty so that speculation is avoided. 
Id. at 670. In the case at hand, there is no connection 
between the Trust and the Respondent. How can the 
Respondent pocket the fees allegedly due the advertising 
trust? 
In conclusion the Appellant submits that the 
reasoning, if any, which justifies any view in the 
Respondent's favor, disintegrates at this level. On the 
one hand, there is no nexus or agreement between the Trust 
and the Appellant at all. On the other hand the Lower 
Court awarded the Respondent damages due the Trust. 
However, there is no nexus or contract between the 
Respondent and the Trust and the latter isn't even a party 
to these proceedings. 
The Appellant earnestly believes an error occurred at 
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the bench below. No damages to the Respondent were proved 
and none should be awarded. 
POINT V 
ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED THE APPELLANT IF HE 
SUCCEEDS ON APPEAL AS THE "PREVAILING PARTY" 
Assuming that the Appellant is successful on appeal, 
the Appellant should be awarded attorney's fees as the 
"prevailing party." Paragraph 32 of the Franchise 
Agreement calls for attorney's fees: 
"32. Litigation Expense. In the event that an 
action at law or suit in equity is brought to 
establish, obtain or enforce any right by either of 
the parties to this agreement, the prevailing party 
in such suit or action, both in the trial and 
appellate courts, shall be entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be recovered from the other party 
as well as that party's costs and disbursements 
incurred in such suit or action." 
The Appellant respectfully requests this Court to 
remand for purposes of awarding attorney's fees to the 
Appellant if it is successful on appeal. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellant avers that Section 18 of the Franchise 
Agreement is clear and unambiguous. There is no 
requirement for the Appellant to join the Ten State Area 
Advertising Association, Inc. There is no language which 
even suggests the Appellant is obligated to pay 2% of his 
gross profits to the separate entity. The Trial Court 
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erred in its construction of Section 18r erred in 
admitting parol and extrinsic evidence to construe Section 
18f and erred in awarding damages allegedly due the 
advertising trust to the Respondent. 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Trial Court's 
Judgment regarding the Appellant's obligation to join the 
Trustf regarding the Appellant's obligation to pay 2% of 
his gross profits to the Trust, and regarding the damages 
found due* The Appellant seeks further a remand for the 
purposes of assessing attorney's fees as the prevailing 
party. 
DATED this A day of July, 1986. 
STEPHEN W. COOK, 
Attorney for Appellant 
COOK & WILDE, P.C. 
6925 Union Park Center 
Suite 490 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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I certify that I hand delivered ten (10) copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to The Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114, this 8th day of July, 1986. 
Midi 
I further certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
three (3) copies of the foregoing Brief to David J. 
Knowlton, Esq., Attorney for Respondent, 2910 Washington 
Blvd., #305, Ogden, Utah 84402, this 8th day of July , 
1986. 
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